INTRODUCTION W e investigate how tax rules interact with foreign investments to affect the value of U.S. multinational corporations' "permanently reinvested earnings" (PRE). Prior studies in economics and accounting examine the direct effect of potential U.S. taxes on the value of PRE. We extend this research by investigating whether fi rm value is affected in a manner consistent with economic theory when PRE is invested in fi nancial rather than operating assets, where the investment in fi nancial assets is to avoid the U.S. repatriation tax.
INTRODUCTION
W e investigate how tax rules interact with foreign investments to affect the value of U.S. multinational corporations' "permanently reinvested earnings" (PRE). Prior studies in economics and accounting examine the direct effect of potential U.S. taxes on the value of PRE. We extend this research by investigating whether fi rm value is affected in a manner consistent with economic theory when PRE is invested in fi nancial rather than operating assets, where the investment in fi nancial assets is to avoid the U.S. repatriation tax.
For U.S. parent companies, PRE are retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries for which no U.S. income tax expense has been recognized in the parents' consolidated fi nancial statements. Under U.S. GAAP (APB Opinion 23 as amended by SFAS 109), no deferred tax expense is required to be recorded on the earnings of foreign subsidiaries when the parent company establishes that the earnings will be permanently reinvested outside the U.S.
1 However, additional U.S. tax could become due in future years if the assets represented by PRE are repatriated to the U.S. parent or are invested in U.S. property.
2 At the time of the repatriation or investment in
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U.S. property, the U.S. will tax the foreign earnings as a dividend and will allow a foreign tax credit for any foreign taxes previously paid on the earnings.
To the extent that investors expect PRE to be repatriated in the future and an additional U.S. tax to be paid on those earnings, investors should reduce their estimate of the fi rm's value by the estimated future tax. 3 Empirical evidence in Collins, Hand, and Shackelford (2001) (CHS) is consistent with investors discounting PRE for the unrecorded U.S. tax that is disclosed in the fi nancial statement notes. CHS interpret their results as evidence that investors incorporate the disclosed tax amount in their valuation of PRE, despite the fact that the tax is not recorded in the fi nancial statements. 4 When foreign subsidiaries reinvesting earnings reach a mature phase and run out of positive net present value investment opportunities, they may begin reinvesting foreign earnings in fi nancial assets, rather than operating assets, to avoid repatriating the accumulated earnings and incurring an immediate U.S. tax. 5 Thus, the U.S. tax rules may work to encourage foreign subsidiaries to accumulate fi nancial assets such as cash outside the U.S. as a way of avoiding current taxes. 6 Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) investigate whether the deferral of U.S. tax on PRE contributes to fi rms accumulating excess cash. After controlling for non-tax reasons for holding cash, they fi nd that excess cash holdings of multinational fi rms are positively associated with their proxy for the amount of additional U.S. tax that would be required if foreign earnings were repatriated. They interpret their fi ndings as evidence that the potential U.S. tax on repatriation induces U.S. multinational fi rms to accumulate excess cash.
Using sample fi rms and a time frame similar to CHS, we obtain the amount of PRE and the disclosed amount of additional U.S. tax that would be due upon repatriation from the income tax footnotes to the 1994, 1995, and 1996 fi nancial statements. 7 We also estimate the cash model from Foley et al. (2007) to obtain a measure of excess cash for each of our sample fi rms. We assume that only fi rms that report a positive repatriation tax are accumulating excess foreign cash to avoid U.S. tax. We further assume that, for the subset of sample fi rms that (1) report a positive amount of repatriation tax, and (2) hold high levels of excess cash, the excess cash is located outside the U.S. CHS have previously demonstrated that, for fi rms reporting a positive U.S. repatriation tax, the value of PRE is lower than for fi rms reporting no tax. Our hypotheses extend this research, predicting that, for fi rms 3 The amount of this reduction in fi rm value can be thought of as the present value of the future tax. Hartman (1985) demonstrates that since both the reinvested earnings and the associated tax will grow in the future, the length of time until repatriation should not affect the present value of the tax on PRE. 4 Bauman and Shaw (2006) fi nd similar results using a more recent sample. Dhaliwal and Krull (2006) show that the market values foreign earnings more highly when fi rms have a larger percentage of PRE relative to total assets; however they do not fi nd that the market impounds the unrecorded tax liability on PRE. PRE have also been studied in connection with earnings management (Krull, 2004) . The impact of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 on PRE has been studied by Blouin and Krull (2008) and Albring, Dzuranin, and Mills (2005) . 5 This decision is investigated in Weichenrieder (1996) , Altshuler and Grubert (2003) , Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, and Shevlin (2005) , and De Waegenaere and Sansing (forthcoming), among others. 6 As used in this paper, and consistent with U.S. GAAP, the term "cash" also includes short-term marketable securities. 7 The sample fi rms and years are chosen to allow us to compare more closely our results with those of CHS, who focus on these same fi rms for 1993. The fi rst year for which 10-K data are available on the SEC Edgar database is 1994, so we begin with that year. We stop with 1996 because, the further we extend the sample period beyond 1994, the more CHS fi rms drop out of our sample, preventing a direct comparison of results between the two studies.
reporting a positive repatriation tax, the value of PRE will be lowest for those fi rms holding large amounts of excess cash, our proxy for fi nancial assets. Our empirical results are consistent with our hypotheses. We fi nd that, similar to CHS, the value of PRE is lower for those sample fi rms that report a positive tax on repatriation relative to the other sample fi rms. However, when we separate the sample fi rms using our measure of excess cash, we fi nd that this lower valuation result is confi ned to those sample fi rms that both (1) report a positive repatriation tax, and (2) have high levels of excess cash. Our results suggest that the result in CHS may not be entirely due to the disclosure of the tax amount, but may also be related to excess foreign cash holdings by fi rms attempting to avoid the U.S. repatriation tax. Our results are consistent with the notion that investing PRE in financial assets is associated with a reduction in fi rm value beyond the hypothetical U.S. repatriation tax. In other words, U.S. repatriation taxes can have both a direct and indirect effect on the value of foreign subsidiaries. The indirect effect comes from reinvestment in financial assets that are not available to the U.S. parent and may not be invested in U.S. property without triggering an additional U.S. tax. These tax-related constraints reduce the benefi t of holding foreign cash relative to holding an equivalent amount of unconstrained cash.
Our results make an important contribution to our understanding of how taxes affect fi rm value by providing empirical evidence that the value of PRE is associated with the nature of the assets in which the foreign subsidiary invests. Foley et al. (2007) provide evidence that the potential U.S. tax on repatriation induces U.S. multinational fi rms to accumulate excess cash. Since U.S. tax law provides an incentive for foreign subsidiaries to defer repatriation of cash, managers must trade off the negative impact of U.S. repatriation taxes on fi rm value with the limited benefi ts that come from reinvesting foreign earnings in fi nancial assets and the fact that these assets are not available directly for use by the U.S. parent. Our results also provide an alternative explanation for the results in CHS. CHS attribute the lower value of PRE for fi rms reporting positive repatriation taxes to the information contained in the tax disclosure. Our results suggest that at least part of that effect may be related to investments in foreign fi nancial assets. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) argue that foreign fi nancial assets can act as "negative leverage" and allow the U.S. parent to borrow more domestically. To the extent this borrowing is costless, Altshuler and Grubert suggest that the U.S. repatriation tax can be successfully avoided. Our results suggest that such alternatives to actual repatriation may be costly, which is consistent with evidence that U.S. multinationals were willing to incur a small but economically meaningful U.S. tax to make large cash repatriations during the tax holiday established by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. 8 This paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides some background to the taxation of PRE, discusses prior empirical and analytical results, and develops our hypotheses. The third section presents our research design and discusses our sample selection process. The fourth section presents the results of our empirical tests, and the fi fth section concludes.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

U.S. Tax Treatment of PRE
The U.S. generally does not tax the earnings of foreign corporations unless the earnings are from a U.S. business. Thus, for U.S. parent corporations the foreign earnings of foreign subsidiaries are not immediately subject to U.S. tax. The foreign earnings remain untaxed by the U.S. until the subsidiary repatriates the earnings in the form of a dividend to the parent, or until the earnings are invested in U.S. property.
9 Upon repatriation, the U.S. taxes the dividend at the statutory U.S. corporate tax rate. 10 The U.S. allows a foreign tax credit for the foreign income taxes that have been paid on the earnings represented by the dividend.
11 This means that the additional U.S. tax due on the repatriated foreign earnings refl ects the difference between the U.S. corporate tax rate and the foreign tax rate (we refer to this additional amount as the "repatriation tax"). Foreign earnings that are never repatriated will never become subject to U.S. tax. Also, to the extent that the foreign tax rate exceeds the U.S. tax rate, the foreign tax credit will completely offset the U.S. tax so that no additional U.S. tax will be due on repatriation.
The above rule is designed to shield foreign earnings from U.S. tax as long as the earnings remain invested in foreign assets. However, to prevent tax avoidance, there are several exceptions to this general tax treatment. An exception in the Subpart F rules of the Internal Revenue Code applies to earnings from fi nancial assets, such as interest or dividends, earned by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent corporation. Under this exception the U.S. taxes currently the foreign earnings from fi nancial assets. A foreign subsidiary that has run out of real investment opportunities and that reinvests earnings from operating assets in fi nancial assets will, therefore, have to pay U.S. tax on the earnings from the fi nancial assets as they are earned, with a foreign tax credit for any foreign tax paid on the same earnings.
An alternative to foreign reinvestment is to repatriate foreign earnings to the parent, pay the additional U.S. tax on the repatriation, and reinvest the after-U.S.-tax foreign earnings in the U.S. 12 Hartman (1985) finds the somewhat counterintuitive result that the length of the deferral of U.S. tax has no effect on this reinvestment decision. Under Hartman's model, the earnings should be reinvested in the location that provides the greatest expected after-local-tax rate of return, even if this means paying a U.S. repatriation tax immediately.
Hartman's result holds if the foreign earnings are reinvested in operating assets. However, an alternative is to reinvest foreign earnings in foreign fi nancial assets, and the impact of this alternative is investigated by Weichenrieder (1996) and Altshuler and Grubert (2003) . Under certain assumptions, reinvesting in foreign fi nancial assets can effectively eliminate the U.S. repatriation tax as a binding constraint. For example, Altshuler and Grubert (2003) argue that fi rms may be able to treat foreign fi nancial assets as "negative leverage," allowing them to increase their domestic borrowing.
If the foreign earnings from operating assets are reinvested in fi nancial assets, then the length of the deferral of the U.S. repatriation tax does impact the reinvestment decision, providing a disincentive to 9 To prevent fi rms from circumventing these provisions, a loan to the U.S. parent is considered an investment in U.S. property. 10 The dividend received is fi rst "grossed up" to refl ect the foreign tax already paid. For example, if a foreign subsidiary earns $100, pays $20 in foreign tax, and repatriates $80 to the U.S. parent, the U.S. taxes $100 = $80/(1-20%). 11 Dividends from foreign subsidiaries generally do not qualify for the dividends received deduction. 12 This assumes that the foreign tax rate is less than the U.S. tax rate. To the extent that the foreign rate is greater than the U.S. rate, the availability of a foreign tax credit will likely eliminate any additional U.S. tax on the repatriation.
repatriate the earnings (see, e.g., Scholes et al., 2005) . Thus, foreign subsidiaries that lack opportunities to reinvest earnings in operating assets have an incentive to defer the U.S. repatriation tax, which may lead to excessive accumulations of fi nancial assets, such as cash and marketable securities. Foley et al. (2007) fi nd that cash balances of U.S. multinationals are infl uenced by the estimated tax burden due on repatriation of foreign earnings. They fi nd that companies with greater expected tax liabilities upon repatriation of foreign earnings have higher cash holdings, and that this cash is located in foreign countries.
13
To summarize, Hartman's results suggest that (in the absence of tax holidays or expected tax holidays, such as the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004) U.S. repatriation taxes should not affect the amount of PRE that is reinvested in foreign operating assets. However, for mature fi rms without positive NPV investment opportunities, the U.S. repatriation tax may affect the amount of PRE invested in foreign fi nancial assets. The tax rules discussed in this section apply to all earnings of foreign subsidiaries, whether or not designated by managers as PRE. The fi nancial reporting rules discussed in the research design section apply only to foreign retained earnings that are designated by managers as being permanently reinvested outside the U.S., which is the focus of our study.
Valuation of PRE
We investigate a setting in which a U.S. multinational fi rm invests in foreign operating assets through a wholly owned foreign subsidiary. As discussed above, if the subsidiary's foreign tax rate is lower than the U.S. rate, the earnings from the operating assets will be taxed at the lower foreign rate until such time as the earnings are repatriated to the parent as a dividend. Each year the foreign subsidiary can reinvest its after-foreign-tax operating earnings in additional foreign operating assets to effectively avoid the repatriation tax, until (assuming decreasing marginal returns from investment) the marginal after-foreign-tax return from additional investment equals the investment's cost of capital.
Once the fi rm has reached this stage we assume there are no additional positive NPV investment opportunities, either in the foreign country or in the U.S. At this point the fi rm's manager must decide what to do with future after-foreign-tax earnings from the foreign operating assets. Two alternative courses of action are available, and have been explored in prior studies (e.g., Weichenrieder, 1996; Altshuler and Grubert, 2003; and De Waegenaere and Sansing, forthcoming) .
14 First, the earnings from the operating assets can be repatriated to the U.S. parent each year as a taxable dividend. If the foreign tax rate is less than the U.S. tax rate, repatriation tax will be payable on the earnings, whereas if the foreign tax rate is equal to or greater than the U.S. rate, the foreign tax credit will completely offset any repatriation tax.
A second course of action, which avoids the U.S. repatriation tax on foreign operating earnings, is to reinvest the after-foreign-tax operating earnings in foreign fi nancial assets. Although investment income (such as interest) from the fi nancial assets will be subject to U.S. tax each year under Subpart F, any additional U.S. tax on the underlying operating earnings represented by the fi nancial assets is deferred indefi nitely. For example, assume 13 Another scenario where Hartman's result does not hold is when there is a "tax holiday." De Waegenaere and Sansing (forthcoming) investigate the effect of expected tax holidays on the foreign reinvestment decision. 14 A third alternative, delaying repatriation until a U.S. "tax holiday" is declared, is investigated by De Waegenaere and Sansing (forthcoming) but is not addressed in this study. the foreign subsidiary earns $100 in operating earnings and pays foreign tax of $20. Repatriating the $80 after-foreign-tax earnings will generate a U.S. repatriation tax of $15 (assuming a 35 percent U.S. tax rate), leaving $65 after-tax. However, if the $80 is invested in foreign fi nancial assets that earn interest at 10 percent, each year the $8 of interest (i.e., $80 × 10%) will be taxed by the U.S. as Subpart F income, but the $15 repatriation tax on the foreign operating earnings reinvested in the fi nancial assets is avoided indefi nitely. Since foreign earnings on fi nancial assets will be taxed at the U.S. rate, the discount rate used to evaluate the U.S. parent's investments in fi nancial assets should be the after-U.S.-tax risk-free rate. Assuming the risk-free rate is constant across countries, reinvestment dominates repatriation as long as the foreign tax rate is less than the U.S. tax rate. This is the optimal decision despite the fact that the future earnings from the foreign financial assets will be immediately subject to tax at the higher U.S. tax rate rather than the lower foreign rate (see, e.g., Altshuler and Grubert, 2003) .
In our empirical tests we consider two types of fi rms: (1) a fi rm for which, because of a high foreign tax rate relative to the U.S. tax rate, immediate repatriation of foreign operating earnings is the optimal decision (called the "repatriating firm"), and (2) a fi rm where, because of a low foreign tax rate relative to the U.S. tax rate, reinvestment in foreign fi nancial assets is the optimal decision (called the "reinvesting fi rm"). Both types of fi rms (repatriating and reinvesting) have foreign subsidiaries that own foreign operating assets generating after-foreign-tax operating earnings. In addition, the foreign subsidiary of the reinvesting fi rm owns foreign fi nancial assets generating foreign interest income subject to immediate U.S. tax.
15 Furthermore, the repatriating fi rm may, for non-tax reasons, also have investments in foreign fi nancial assets. We assume that these assets serve a non-tax purpose and are not kept to avoid U.S. tax on repatriation.
Consider the relative values of foreign financial assets for these two types of fi rms. Finance theory argues that there are benefi ts to a public corporation from holding cash, and recent empirical work has found evidence consistent with these benefits Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007) . On average $1 book value of cash is valued at $1, but the value of cash varies cross-sectionally based on such factors as the amount of cash held, leverage, access to securities markets, and the presence of growth options.
Finance theory also argues that there are costs associated with holding too much cash (particularly agency costs), and that shareholders would prefer that excess cash be distributed rather than retained (Faulkender and Wang, 2006) . Therefore, managers must trade off the benefi ts and costs of holding cash in arriving at the optimal level of fi nancial assets.
We argue that foreign cash held by the reinvesting fi rm to avoid U.S. taxes does not provide the same benefits as cash held by repatriating fi rms because the cash is not available for investments in the U.S. or for use by the U.S. parent without triggering an additional U.S. tax. For example, cash held by a foreign subsidiary to avoid U.S. tax can only be used to make acquisitions without incurring a tax cost if the acquisitions are outside of the U.S. Similarly, if the U.S. parent needs cash domestically, the existence of cash in foreign subsidiaries does not allow the U.S. parent to avoid the transaction costs associated with new borrowing. Since the foreign cash must remain outside of the U.S. to achieve tax deferral, and cannot be invested in U.S. assets, we argue that the foreign cash is "constrained" relative to cash held by the U.S. parent, or cash held by a repatriating foreign subsidiary, and that the constrained foreign cash does not provide the same benefits as unconstrained cash. Because foreign cash held by a reinvesting fi rm will generate at least the same level of agency costs as cash held in the U.S., but does not provide the same benefi ts, we argue that foreign cash held by a reinvesting fi rm to avoid U.S. repatriation tax has a lower value than cash held by a repatriating fi rm. 16 We expect that the value of foreign operating assets for both types of fi rms is greater than the value of fi nancial assets, since the operating assets represent positive NPV investments at the time they were acquired. Although the marginal return on the last $1 reinvested in operating assets is assumed to be equal to the assets' discount rate, the average return on the operating assets is greater than the discount rate. The exact value of these assets will depend on the pre-tax return, the foreign tax rate, and the discount rate, all of which will differ across countries.
Therefore, while we predict the value of foreign operating assets is greater than fi nancial assets, we cannot predict which fi rms (repatriating or reinvesting) will have a higher value for foreign operating assets. We summarize our prediction of the values of the foreign subsidiaries' assets in panel A of Table 1 , where we arbitrarily assign a value of one to the value of foreign fi nancial assets held by the repatriating fi rm.
The above discussion of the values of the foreign subsidiaries' assets can be expressed as a function of its operating and fi nancial assets: V = β 1 OA + β 2 FA. This equation assumes that we can separately identify foreign operating and fi nancial assets. Because of data limitations we are only able to identify PRE, which consists of both operating and fi nancial assets. In our empirical tests, our regression will look like V = γ(OA + FA), and our estimated coeffi cient will refl ect a weighted average of the two coeffi cients β 1 and β 2 . Therefore, to the extent a sample fi rm has a relatively high proportion of foreign fi nancial assets, the estimated regression coeffi cient will be similar to the predicted coeffi cient for fi nancial assets, whereas if the sample fi rm has a relatively high 
proportion of foreign operating assets, the estimated regression coeffi cient will be similar to the predicted coeffi cients for operating assets.
Hypotheses
Based on the discussion above and summarized in Table 1 , we are able to make two predictions about the effect of fi nancial assets on the value of PRE.
H1: Permanently reinvested earnings related
to fi nancial assets are valued less than those related to operating assets.
Hypothesis 1 makes a comparison between the values of PRE consisting of fi nancial assets and operating assets, and predicts that fi nancial assets will, in general, be valued less than operating assets. The idea that fi nancial assets are valued less than operating assets at the fi rm level has been demonstrated in prior research. However, our hypothesis relates to the value of PRE rather than the value of the fi rm as a whole. As discussed above, we are only able to measure fi nancial and operating assets at the fi rm level. Therefore, in operationalizing our hypothesis we are extending prior fi ndings at the fi rm level to predict that the value of PRE will be lower for those fi rms that, at the fi rm level, have a relatively high level of fi nancial assets.
H2: Permanently reinvested earnings related to fi nancial assets are valued less for fi rms that would incur a repatriation tax (i.e., "reinvesting" fi rms) relative to fi rms that could repatriate with no additional U.S. tax (i.e., "repatriating" fi rms).
Hypothesis 2 focuses on how U.S. repatriation taxes affect the value of foreign fi nancial assets. As discussed previously, cash held by a foreign subsidiary to avoid U.S. taxes provides a smaller benefi t than cash available to be used in the U.S., while generating the same agency costs as unconstrained cash. We operationalize this hypothesis by comparing the value of PRE for repatriating and reinvesting fi rms where both groups of fi rms have relatively high levels of fi nancial assets at the fi rm level.
An example of a reinvesting fi rm from our sample is Coca-Cola Company. CocaCola reports $542 million of permanently reinvested earnings with taxes of approximately $190 million due if those earnings were repatriated at December 31, 1996. In addition Coca-Cola is classifi ed as a high excess cash fi rm. We expect that the PRE of Coca-Cola is a combination of operating and fi nancial assets and that Coca-Cola is accumulating fi nancial assets to avoid the additional taxes due upon repatriation of PRE.
An example of a repatriating firm from our sample is Navistar. In its 1996 10-K, Navistar reports $30 million of permanently reinvested earnings with no additional tax due upon repatriation. In addition, Navistar is classifi ed as a high excess cash fi rm. We expect the PRE of Navistar to be a combination of operating and fi nancial assets; however, we assume the fi nancial assets are held for non-tax reasons. 17 We argue that the fi nancial assets represented by the PRE of Coca-Cola are constrained due to the repatriation tax, while any fi nancial assets represented by the PRE of Navistar are unconstrained. Since both fi rms are classifi ed as having high excess cash, hypothesis 2 predicts that Coca-Cola's PRE is valued lower than Navistar's PRE.
While we expect the value of foreign cash held by reinvesting fi rms to be lower than cash held by repatriating fi rms, we are only able to measure the amount of PRE held by each type of fi rm, and the amount of total cash at the consolidated firm level. An alternative reason for expecting the result predicted by hypothesis 2 is that, for the repatriating fi rms in our sample that have large amounts of excess cash, the cash may not be held by foreign subsidiaries, and may, therefore, not be part of PRE. In other words, it may be the case that our sample repatriating fi rms that hold large amounts of excess cash actually have PRE that consists primarily of operating assets with little or no fi nancial assets. This would also result in the PRE of reinvesting fi rms being valued less than the PRE of repatriating fi rms when both types of fi rms have large amounts of excess cash.
It is important to note that the lower valuation predicted by hypothesis 2 is not due directly to the additional U.S. tax that would be due on planned repatriation, since we do not anticipate that the fi nancial assets will ever become subject to U.S. tax. 18 In addition, in our empirical tests we control for the tax on hypothetical repatriation reported by the fi rm. The lower valuation is a result of reinvesting firms investing in financial assets that do not provide the same benefi t as U.S. fi nancial assets. Absent repatriation taxes, managers could choose to use these fi nancial assets in a manner that would increase fi rm value.
To operationalize these hypotheses requires several assumptions, and we restate them here for clarity. First, we assume that fi rms with high amounts of excess cash also have excess investments in other financial assets. Second, we assume that fi rms that report a positive repatriation tax are accumulating excess foreign fi nancial assets to avoid U.S. tax.
That is, these fi rms are the reinvesting fi rms, while those fi rms that do not disclose the amount of additional tax upon repatriation of PRE represent fi rms that repatriate all foreign operating earnings. Third, we assume that, for the subset of sample fi rms that (1) report a positive amount of repatriation tax, and (2) hold high levels of excess cash, the excess cash and other financial assets are located in subsidiaries outside the U.S. These assumptions are consistent with the empirical fi ndings reported by Foley et al. (2007) , who show that fi rms with high repatriation tax burdens hold signifi cant amounts of excess cash abroad. Fourth, we assume that if repatriating fi rms hold excess cash, it is not being held to avoid U.S. tax, and is available to be used by the U.S. parent without any tax constraints.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION
Research Design
To test our hypotheses we use a valuation model that allows us to estimate how PRE are related to fi rm value. We adopt the valuation model used by CHS, which is a variant of the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model:
where M V E = m a r k e t v a l u e o f e q u i t y (data199*data25);
19 DNI = net income from domestic operations (data272 -(data63 + data173 + data269 + data271)); FNI = net income from foreign operations (data273 -(data64 + data270));
18 However, the decrease in value due to holding fi nancial assets should not exceed the amount of repatriation tax avoided by the fi rm. Otherwise the fi rm would be better off paying the repatriation tax. In other words, the additional U.S. tax on repatriation related to fi nancial assets acts as an upper bound on the reduction in fi rm value due to holding excess foreign cash. 19 The data numbers refer to Compustat data items.
Net BVE = book value of equity (data60) minus PRE; PRE = permanently reinvested earnings, obtained from an examination of the fi nancial statement footnote disclosures for our sample fi rms; and PRETAX = dollar amount of tax due on hypothetical repatriation of permanently reinvested earnings, obtained from an examination of the fi nancial statement footnote disclosures for our sample fi rms.
All variables have a time-and firmspecifi c subscript that is not shown in equation [1] . We control for differences across years in the sample by including an indicator variable for each year. We deflate all variables by the number of shares outstanding (data25). 20 We measure all variables as of the fi scal-year end. In untabulated analyses, we measure market value of equity at the end of the fi rst quarter of the subsequent year to allow fi nancial information to be disseminated. The direction of the coeffi cients for these results are the same as those reported in the tables and the signifi cance levels are at least as high those reported in the tables.
To test our hypotheses we must (1) determine whether a fi rm reinvests or repatriates its foreign operating earnings and (2) estimate proxies for those permanently reinvested earnings invested in operating and fi nancial assets, as fi rms do not disclose these components in their fi nancial statements. That is, we must identify to which of the four groups identifi ed in Table 1 our fi rms belong. We use the tax disclosure on PRE repatriation to proxy for whether a fi rm reinvests or repatriates its foreign operating earnings. We use a measure of excess cash developed in prior studies as our proxy for high amounts of fi nancial assets. We discuss each of these proxies below.
Firms reporting PRE are required by SFAS 109 to disclose both the amount of earnings designated as permanently reinvested as well as an estimate of the tax liability that would be incurred if those earnings were repatriated. There are three different categories of disclosures made by fi rms with respect to the repatriation taxes related to PRE (see CHS): (1) the unrecorded amount of tax that managers estimate would be due if the PRE were repatriated; (2) a statement that, because of foreign tax credits, no additional tax would be due upon the repatriation of PRE; and (3) a statement that the determination of the U.S. tax that would be due on repatriation of PRE is "not practicable." However, some fi rms simply ignore the requirement to report the amount of hypothetical tax and say nothing, presumably because the tax would not be material, and this creates a fourth category.
Since we are using the tax disclosure on PRE repatriation, we begin our analysis by replicating CHS. We separate our sample fi rms into groups, based on the type of management disclosure about the tax associated with PRE. To investigate how the type of disclosure affects the value of PRE, we add indicator variables to equation [1] and interact those indicator variables with PRE:
[2] MVE = β 0 + β 1 DNI + β 2 FNI + β 3 Net BVE + β 4 PRE + β 5 PRETAX + β 6 TAX NP + β 7 TAX NP *PRE + β 8 TAX P + β 9 TAX P *PRE + ε, where TAX NP = 1 if the fi rm reports that the tax associated with the repatriation of PRE is not practicable to estimate, and 0 otherwise; and TAX P = 1 if the fi rm reports a positive tax amount associated with the repatriation of PRE, and 0 otherwise.
The coeffi cient on PRE (β 4 ) provides the value of PRE for those fi rms that either state that the tax on PRE repatriation would be zero, or provide no disclosure on the repatriation tax. 21 Based on the results of CHS, we expect the coeffi cient on PRE to be greater than zero, and the coeffi cient on TA X P *PRE (β 9 ) to be less than zero.
We assume those fi rms that disclose a positive tax amount on the repatriation of PRE (TAX P ) are fi rms that reinvest all foreign operating earnings into fi nancial assets, while those fi rms that disclose no additional tax from the repatriation of PRE are fi rms that repatriate all foreign operating earnings. 22 It is not clear whether the fi rms that disclose the repatriation tax is not practicable to estimate would repatriate or reinvest foreign operating earnings. Therefore, we analyze this group (TAX NP ) separately and make no predictions about the value of their PRE.
Firms are required to disclose the amount of PRE, but are not required to disaggregate it into its operating and fi nancial asset components. Ideally, we would measure the fi nancial assets at the foreign subsidiary level; however, due to data limitations, we proxy for high levels of fi nancial assets by using a measure of excess cash. Firms can hold cash for a variety of reasons . To control for these other reasons, we use the residuals from the model in Foley et al. (2007) as our measure of excess cash. In the Appendix, we explain the details of the model and its estimation.
An assumption we make is that fi rms with high amounts of excess cash will also have excess investments in fi nancial assets. This assumption is likely to hold on average, since cash is the most common fi nancial asset. We are only able to estimate excess cash on a fi rm-wide basis. Implicit in our analysis is the assumption that a high amount of excess cash at the fi rm level implies a high amount of excess cash at the subsidiary level. This assumption is consistent with the fi ndings reported by Foley et al. (2007) , who show that fi rms with high repatriation tax burdens hold signifi cant amounts of excess cash abroad. For purposes of testing our hypotheses, we expect that those fi rms with high amounts of excess cash (i.e., more investments in fi nancial assets) and that report a positive tax from PRE repatriation are more likely to be holding foreign fi nancial assets in response to repatriation taxes.
To test our hypotheses we classify our fi rms into six groups based on the tax disclosure on PRE and the level of excess cash, which we refer to as the tax/cash groups. We modify equation [2] 21 We assume that those fi rms that provide no disclosure do so because the tax would not be material, and combine them with the fi rms reporting zero tax. To allow comparability with the CHS results, we also show these fi rms separately in Table 4 . 22 While fi rms may also reinvest in foreign operating assets, we assume that our sample fi rms have reached the optimal investment in operating assets and are, therefore, "mature" fi rms that lack positive NPV investments. 23 Theoretically, we expect the coeffi cient on net fi nancial assets at the fi rm level to be smaller than the coeffi cient on net operating assets. In an untabulated sensitivity test, we obtain similar results as those presented in the tables if we include net fi nancial assets and net operating assets, rather than book value of equity. The consistency of the results provides further assurance that our results are not simply capturing a valuation difference between operating and fi nancial assets at the fi rm level. The coeffi cient on PRE (γ 4 ) represents the sixth tax/cash group that serves as the base case: those fi rms that (1) report no additional tax from PRE repatriation or do not disclose a tax associated with PRE; and (2) have low excess cash. We categorize observations as having high amounts of excess cash based on the residual from our excess cash model (discussed in the Appendix). A fi rm is considered to have high excess cash (EC H ) if the residual from the model in a given year and industry falls in the upper quintile of the excess cash residuals for all Compustat fi rms. Because our upper quintile cut-off as a defi nition of excess cash is arbitrary, we also use other measures of excess cash to test the sensitivity of our results to the choice of cut-off. Results using the upper quartile and upper third of the sample are similar to those using the upper quintile, but in general as the size of the high excess cash sample is expanded, the t-statistics in our tests of signifi cance become lower.
Our fi rst hypothesis is that permanently reinvested fi nancial assets are valued less than permanently reinvested operating assets. Therefore, we expect: Our second hypothesis is that fi nancial assets for those fi rms reporting positive tax associated with PRE will be valued less than fi nancial assets for those fi rms reporting zero or no tax associated with PRE. Therefore, we expect:
We summarize our predictions for the different groups in panel B of Table 1 .
Sample
We identify our sample based on the 337 fi rms listed in the appendix of CHS. CHS analyze a sample of fi rms that disclose permanently reinvested earnings during fi scal year 1993. We use the same sample firms to allow a direct comparison of our results with the CHS results. Seven observations are eliminated because we are unable to locate them in the Compustat database, leaving us with 330 fi rms. We collect data on these fi rms over the 1994 to 1996 time period (990 fi rm-year observations), the closest period to the CHS sample period for which SEC EDGAR data are available. While this is not the most current time period available, there have been no changes in the accounting rules that cause us to expect a difference in the valuation of PRE from our earlier time period to a more current time period. However, many important non-accounting changes have occurred since 1996, such as foreign tax rates and transaction costs, making it impossible for us to conclude that our results would hold in a current sample. Our sample is reduced by 151 firm-year observations that lack suffi cient data to estimate the excess cash model and by 45 additional observations that do not report PRE or do not have suffi cient data on Compustat. We restrict our sample to include fi rms that report positive PRE and positive book value of equity. This results in a fi nal sample of 751 fi rm-year observations. Table 2 provides detailed summary statistics for our sample. To mitigate the influence of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at 1 and 99 percent. Columns 1 to 3 provide summary statistics for the full sample. Columns 4 to 7 provide means for those fi rms that disclose a positive tax on PRE repatriation, state that there is no additional tax on PRE repatriation, state that it is not practicable to estimate the tax on PRE repatriation, or disclose no information regarding the tax on PRE repatriation, respectively. Since we begin with the CHS sample of fi rms, our sample has similar characteristics to theirs.
The average price is $32.64 for the sample, which is consistent with prior research. Across the different tax disclosures on PRE, the average price is similar with the positive tax disclosure having the largest price of $39.10. Domestic net income per share is consistently larger, on average, than foreign net income both for the full sample and across the different tax disclosures on PRE. The amount of book value of equity net of PRE per share and the amount of PRE per share does not vary much across the different tax disclosure regimes. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our six tax/cash groups. The means and medians for most regression variables are similar across groups. We include leverage and size, measured using either total assets or sales, as additional descriptive variables. Leverage is similar across the six groups. The no additional tax on PRE and low excess cash group is smaller than the other fi ve groups based on both assets and sales; however it is not always statistically signifi cantly smaller than the other fi ve groups.
We also provide descriptive statistics of the residual from the cash model (XSCash) and cash as a percentage of total assets (CashRatio) by tax/cash group. For fi rms classifi ed as high excess cash, we fi nd no difference in the residuals from the cash Price is the price per share (data199). DNI is the after-tax domestic net income and is calculated as (data272 -(data63 + data173 + data269 + data271)). FNI is after-tax foreign net income and is calculated as (data273 -data64 + data270)). Net BVE is book value of common equity net of PRE (data60 -PRE). PRE is the dollar amount of permanently reinvested earnings collected from the 10-K. PRETAX is the dollar amount of the estimated tax on the hypothetical repatriation of permanently reinvested earnings collected from the 10-K. All variables are defl ated by shares outstanding (data25), except Price, and are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Table 7A . CashRatio is the ratio of cash (data1) to total assets (data6). All other variables are defi ned in Table 2. model across the tax groups. Furthermore, the positive tax and high excess cash group has a smaller CashRatio (0.21) than the zero tax and high excess cash group (0.25). However, a higher percentage of fi rms that disclose a positive tax on PRE are classifi ed as high excess cash (29 percent) compared to those fi rms that disclose no tax on PRE (16 percent). This is consistent with results in Foley et al. (2007) , who fi nd that excess cash holdings of multinational fi rms are positively associated with repatriation taxes. One variable to note is foreign net income (FNI). For the positive tax and high excess cash group (TAX P EC H ), foreign net income is significantly larger than the other fi ve groups. Furthermore, for this group foreign net income is similar in magnitude to domestic net income, while in the other fi ve groups foreign net income is much smaller than domestic net income. 25 This fi nding-that the group we identify as having large amounts of foreign cash for tax reasons (TAX P EC H ) also has large foreign net income-gives us confi dence that our measure of excess cash is a good proxy for high levels of foreign cash, since Foley et al. (2007) fi nd that foreign cash holdings are positively related to foreign net income (see Table 5 in Foley et al. (2007) ).
RESULTS
The fi rst column of Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation [1] . 26 Consistent with prior research, we fi nd that the coefficients on domestic and foreign net income and net book value of equity are signifi cantly positive. The coeffi cient on PRE is signifi cantly positive and is signifi cantly larger than the coeffi cient on net book value of equity. This result is *, **, *** signifi cant at p < 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. All variables are defi ned in Table 2 and are defl ated by shares outstanding. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable is market value of equity.
consistent with the fi ndings in CHS and prior research on the higher valuation of foreign earnings (e.g., Bodnar and Weintrop, 1997) . This result suggests that high levels of PRE may indicate high future foreign earnings or that PRE are invested in operating assets that will generate future operating earnings.
To enhance comparability with the results of CHS, we group fi rm years into four smaller subsamples based on the tax disclosure on PRE repatriation. The fi nal four columns of Table 4 report the results of separate regressions of equation [1] for each subsample based on the type of tax disclosure provided. Since the value of PRETAX is zero for three of the four groups, we do not include it in these regressions. We note that the valuation implications of PRE under this specifi cation are generally consistent with CHS. First, there is a positive and signifi cant association between market value and PRE for the zero tax on PRE repatriation subsample, the not practicable to estimate the tax on PRE repatriation subsample, and the no tax information on PRE repatriation subsample (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). For the positive tax disclosure subsample (column 2), the coeffi cient on PRE is negative. This suggests that PRE for this subsample are discounted relative to other equity components.
In Table 5 we further divide the sample fi rms into their tax/cash groups based on both the disclosure of the repatriation tax (examined in Table 4 ) and the amount of excess cash the fi rm holds based on our excess cash model. Column 1 reports the results of estimating equation [2] , separating out the effect on the value of PRE based on the tax disclosure associated with PRE repatriation. Similar to the results in Table 4 , the coeffi cient on PRE for the positive tax group (TAX P *PRE) is negative and signifi cant.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 provide results from estimating equation [3] , separating out the effect on the value of PRE based on both the tax disclosure associated with PRE repatriation and the level of excess cash held by the fi rm. The two models are similar, except that column 3 contains an additional variable (log of shares outstanding) that controls for size differences. We include this variable because we found that, even after scaling the variables by shares outstanding, large fi rms (i.e., those with more shares outstanding) still had higher price per share than small fi rms (see Easton and Sommers, 2003) . Our discussion of the results focuses on the model in column 3.
The coeffi cient (-1.49) on the interaction of PRE with the indicator variable for the positive tax on PRE repatriation and high excess cash group (TAX P EC H *PRE) is negative and signifi cant. It is also signifi cantly smaller than the coefficient (-0.28) on the interaction of PRE with the indicator variable for the positive tax on PRE repatriation and low excess cash group (TAX P EC L *PRE) (F-statistic = 3.37, pvalue < 0.05). Furthermore, the coeffi cient (-2.40) on the interaction of PRE with the indicator variable for the not practicable to estimate the tax on PRE repatriation and high excess cash group (TAX NP EC H *PRE) is signifi cantly smaller than the coeffi cient (-0.41) on the interaction of PRE with the indicator variable for the not practicable to estimate the tax on PRE repatriation and low excess cash group (TAX NP EC L *PRE) (F-statistic = 12.21, p-value < 0.001). These results are consistent with hypothesis 1, suggesting that PRE invested in operating assets are valued higher than PRE invested in financial assets. However, the coeffi cient (0.78) on the interaction of PRE with the indicator variable for the no tax on PRE repatriation and high excess cash group (TAX 0,N EC H *PRE) is not signifi cantly different from zero (t-statistic = 0.98, p-value = 0.33), which is inconsistent with hypothesis 1.
The coeffi cient (-1.49) on the interaction of PRE with the indicator variable for the positive tax on PRE repatriation and The coeffi cients on the interaction terms in Table 5 measure how the coeffi cients on PRE for fi ve of the six subsamples differ from the coeffi cient on PRE without an interaction term, the base case. The base case, with no interaction term, consists of those observations where the fi rm reports no additional tax from PRE repatriation, or does not disclose a tax associated with PRE, and has low excess cash. To show the actual coefficient on PRE for each subsample requires that the coeffi cient on the interaction term be added to the coeffi cient on PRE. Table 6 , panel A reports these coeffi cients for column 2 of Table 5 (without the control for size) and panel B reports the coeffi cients for column 3 of Table 5 (including the control for size). Our discussion of the results focuses on panel B, the results after controlling for size.
The valuation coeffi cient on PRE for the high excess cash fi rms that disclose a positive tax on PRE repatriation (0.14) is positive but not signifi cantly different from zero (F-statistic = 0.03, p-value = 0.86). It is also signifi cantly smaller than the coeffi cients for the two comparison groups. The coeffi cient on PRE for the high excess cash fi rms that disclose no tax information or zero tax is 2.41 (F-statistic = 4.17, p-value < 0.05), and the coefficient on PRE for the fi rms that disclose a positive tax on PRE repatriation but have low excess cash is 1.35 (F-statistic = 3.37, p-value < 0.05). These results suggest that the valuation difference is not merely driven by the existence of a large amount of fi nancial assets. Rather, the fact that fi rms appear to hold the fi nancial assets for tax reasons drives the difference in the valuation of PRE. *, **, *** signifi cantly different from zero at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. † , † † , † † † signifi cantly different from corresponding group at p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 27 We note that the coeffi cients on some of the indicator variables representing intercept differences (such as TAX P EC H ) are larger than others. These intercept differences are not the subject of our hypotheses, and we have no explanation as to why they differ across the different tax/cash groups.
CONCLUSION
We investigate the value of permanently reinvested foreign earnings of U.S. multinationals, focusing particularly on how fi rm value is affected by reinvesting PRE in fi nancial rather than operating assets, where the reinvestment in fi nancial assets is to avoid the U.S. repatriation tax. Prior research has examined the direct effect that U.S. taxes have on the value of PRE. We extend this research by examining the interaction of U.S. tax rules with the underlying assets represented by PRE to determine how this affects the valuation implications of PRE.
Our empirical results are generally consistent with our hypotheses. We fi nd that, consistent with CHS, the value of PRE for those sample fi rms reporting a positive tax on PRE repatriation is significantly lower than the other sample fi rms. However, when we separate the sample using our measure of excess cash, we fi nd that this lower valuation result is confi ned to those observations that both (1) report a positive repatriation tax, and (2) have high levels of excess cash. Our results suggest that the results in CHS may not be entirely due to the disclosure of the tax amount, but may also be related to excess cash holdings by fi rms attempting to avoid the U.S. repatriation tax.
These results make an important contribution to tax research by providing empirical evidence that the value of PRE depends on the nature of the assets in which the foreign subsidiary reinvests. Since U.S. tax law provides an incentive for foreign subsidiaries to defer repatriation of cash, managers must trade off the negative impact of U.S. repatriation taxes on fi rm value with the lower benefi ts that come from reinvesting foreign earnings in fi nancial assets. Our results also provide an alternative explanation for the results demonstrated by CHS. CHS attribute the lower value of PRE for fi rms reporting positive repatriation taxes to the information contained in the tax disclosure. Our results suggest that the lower value of PRE are attributable not only to the impounding of the unrecorded tax, but also to a lower value for fi nancial assets held by foreign subsidiaries attempting to avoid U.S.taxes. to measure normal, or expected, cash. The difference between actual cash and expected cash is our measure of excess cash.
Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, there is no liquidity premium and cash holdings bear no opportunity cost. Market imperfections give rise to numerous reasons managers decide to hold cash. Keynes (1936) argues that cash holdings can reduce transaction costs of raising external funds where these costs arise from converting non-cash assets into cash. He also argues that cash holdings can serve as a precautionary measure by enabling managers to take advantage of investment opportunities in the presence of costly external fi nancing.
Empirical evidence in Opler et al. (1999) provides support for both the precautionary and transaction costs motives. Foley et al. (2007) fi nd that fi rms also hold cash for tax motivations based on the estimated tax burden upon repatriation of foreign earnings. We estimate a variation of the Foley et al. (2007) model for all fi rms in the Compustat universe over the same time period covering our sample. where Cash = Cash and short-term investments (data1); NetAssets = Net Assets calculated as total assets less cash and short-term investments (data6 -data1); DPI = Pre-tax domestic net income (data272); FPI = Pre-tax foreign net income (data273); Ln(NetAssets) = Natural log of NetAssets (data6 -data1); DividendPayment = Indicator variable equal to one if the company paid a cash dividend in the current year (data127>0); BVE/MVE = Ratio of the book value of equity (data60) to market value equity (data199*data25); OpIncs = Two-digit industry standard deviation of operating income defl ated by net assets (data13/(data6 -data1)) from the 10-year period 1984-1993; RD/NetAssets = R&D expenditures (data46); set to zero if data46 is missing; CapEx/NetAssets = Capital expenditures (data128); and MktLeverage = Ratio of long-(data9) and short-term debt (data34) to the sum of long-and short-term debt and the market value of equity (data199*data25).
All variables have a time-and fi rm-specifi c subscript, which is not shown in equation [A1], except OpIncσ, which has an industry-specifi c subscript. Although Foley et al. (2007) include year and industry fi xed effects, we suppress the constant and include indicator variables for each year in the sample. Because the OpIncσ variable is measured on an industry basis, any industry effects should be captured in this variable. Whereas Foley et al. (2007) require each fi rm-year in their sample to have assets in excess of $100 million, we require each fi rm-year to have net assets in excess of only $1 million because our sample includes smaller fi rms.
The results of this model, shown in Table 7A are generally consistent with those of Foley et al. (2007) with a few exceptions. The coeffi cient on capital expenditures to net assets is positive and signifi cant in our model, but is negative and signifi cant in Foley et al. (2007) ; however, Opler et al. (1999) , using a similar model, fi nd a signifi cant positive coeffi cient on this variable. In addition, the coeffi cient on domestic pre-tax income to net assets is signifi cantly negative in our estimation, but insignifi cant in Foley et al. (2007) .
The residual from equation [A1] is a proxy for excess cash. We categorize observations as having signifi cant amounts of excess cash based on whether the residual in a given year and industry (based on two-digit SIC code) falls in the upper quintile of all Compustat fi rms. Out of our 751 observations, we fi nd that approximately 19 percent of observations are in the uppermost quintile of excess cash in a given year. is the natural log of net assets (data6 -data1). DividendPayment is an indicator variable equal to one if the company paid a dividend in a given year (data127>0). BVE/MVE is the ratio of book value of equity (data60) to market value of equity (data199*data25). OpIncσ is the industry standard deviation of operating income divided by net assets (data13/(data6 -data1)) and is estimated over the Compustat universe from [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . RD/NetAssets and CapEx/NetAssets are research and development expenditures (data46) and capital expenditures (data128) divided by net assets, respectively. As in Foley et al. (2007) and Opler et al. (1999) observations with missing R&D are coded as zero.
MktLeverage is the long-(data9) and short-term debt (data34) divided by the sum of long-and short-term debt and the market value of equity (data199*data25).
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